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The Impacts of Investment in Internal Audit Functions on the Going Concern Opinion 
for Financially Distressed Firms 
 





We investigate the effects of internal audit investments on financially distressed firms in Malaysia. Specifically, we examine 
the impacts of internal audit investments on these firms’ going concern opinion. We argue that higher internal audit 
investments expedite these firms’ recoverability by improving their controls and operations. The assurance and consulting 
activities provided by internal auditors enable these firms to mitigate the material uncertainty of the going concern opinions 
issued by external auditors. To examine such relationship, we chose 137 firm-year observations of Malaysian financially 
distressed firms listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2016 to 2018. We ran a logistic regression analysis and found that internal 
audit investments are negatively and significantly associated with the going concern opinions reported by an external 
auditor. This result suggests that high internal audit investments reduce the likelihood for an external auditor to issue a 
going concern opinion. As stated in ISA 570, if recovery plans have no material uncertainty and are sufficient to mitigate 
the going concern problem (which is argued to be assisted by the internal audit function of the firm), then an external auditor 
can issue a clean audit report even for firms that are in financial distress. Evidence from this study contributes to our 
understanding of the importance of investments in internal audit functions and highlights that the assurance and consultation 
from internal auditors can ensure a careful monitoring of the strategies and operations of firms.  
 





As of 31 July 2018, a total of 24 firms (2.5% of 909 firms) listed on Bursa Malaysia have been classified as PN17. Anecdotal 
evidence shows that the percentage of financially distressed firms has reached worrisome levels for shareholders, creditors 
and regulators, especially during periods of economic downturn (NST 2018). Financially distressed firms are those that need 
to be restructured or revived in order to maintain their listing status. These firms include those that receive modified opinions 
with emphasis of matters on going concern paragraph. As economists anticipate a slow economic growth and a highly 
uncertain external environment, the ability to ensure stable business operations in the future is a priority. Accordingly, we 
aim to investigate the effect of investment in internal audit functions on the going concern opinions for financially distressed 
firms. 
A going concern opinion is issued when external auditors have material uncertainties regarding the survival of firms 
within a year. Material uncertainty refers to events or conditions that may trigger auditors to cast doubts on the ability of 
firms to continue with their business (ISA 570). For financially distressed firms, external auditors have a higher likelihood 
to issue a going concern opinion given that they need to assess higher uncertainty events for financially distressed firms than 
for financially healthy firms. However, these material uncertainties can be mitigated with proper recovery plans, such as 
asset liquidations, borrowing arrangements, debt restructuring, and capital acquisition. If the recovery plans of these firms 
are coordinated well and satisfy the external auditors’ assessment on these firms’ ability to continue with their operations, 
then auditors can issue clean reports to these firms despite being financially distressed.  
A going concern opinion is issued to inform shareholders about the financial viability of a firm. This opinion 
indicates that a firm is financially distressed whether due to its poor liquidity position or increasing loss. In other words, a 
going concern opinion provides an indication that the firms are approaching bankruptcy and that external auditors are 
uncertain about the future viability of these firms (Blay & Geiger 2013). If a firm has a recovery plan and its management 
is able to execute such plan properly, then a going concern opinion can be avoided. Therefore, to reduce the going concern 
problems of a financially distressed firm, an external auditor needs to evaluate the strategies, plans, and future actions of its 
management. Firms should also have effective internal control and efficient operational systems to help external auditors 
determine their future financial performance and their ability to operate. Therefore, this study aims to highlight the role of 
internal auditors in corporate governance, especially in the going concern risk assessment of firms. We examine the roles of 
internal auditors in facilitating going concern risk assessment as part of their assurance and consulting activities in reviewing 
and analyzing the financial and operating risks of firms. 
Previous studies identify several determinants of going concern opinion. For example, a going concern opinion 
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leverage (Mutchler 1985), (3) low profitability (Numan & Willekens 2011), (4) severe internal control weaknesses (Goh et 
al. 2013), and (5) high loan default (Carcello et al. 2000). Recent studies in Malaysia suggest that certain factors, such as 
delisting status (Reza 2019), can influence going concern opinion. However, despite the large number of studies on the 
determinants of the likelihood for an external auditor to issue going concern opinion, the influence of internal auditors on 
these opinions remains largely unknown. In this paper, we aim to show how the results of an existing going concern 
propensity model change when internal audit investment is added as a variable to this model. 
This research chooses the Malaysian setting to study the relationship between internal audit investments and going 
concern problem reported by external auditors for two reasons. First, previous studies that use Malaysian data reveal that 
not issuing modified opinions about a going concern problem is common in Malaysia. For example, Abdul Wahab et al. 
(2013) find that only 6.3% of auditors in Malaysia issue a going concern opinion despite the large number of financially 
distressed firms they detect. However, recent studies suggest that a larger percentage of financially distressed firms have 
received going concern reports (e.g., Raza et al. 2019; Osman et al. 2016; Osman et al. 2018), thereby raising the question 
on whether the low number of financially distressed firms receiving a going concern opinion can be due to other factors, 
such as the effectiveness of internal audit functions. Second, Malaysia is unique in terms of the availability of data on internal 
audit investments disclosed by publicly listed companies. According to the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia, all 
publicly listed companies should disclose the costs they incur for their internal audit functions (Wan-Hussin & Bamahros 
2013). Using the available data, we examine whether effective internal audit functions can influence the recoverability 
process of financially distressed firms by assessing the risks and control of management recovery plans by internal auditors. 
As internal auditors are in the best position to comprehend and articulate business operations (Al-Dhamari et al. 2018), it is 
expected that the assurance and consulting services provided by internal auditors can improve the operational performance 
and internal control effectiveness of firms, which in turn can lead to an improved financial performance. An effective internal 
audit function, which is proxied by the amount of internal audit investments, is predicted to increase the probability for firms 
to receive clean audit opinions and avoid a going concern opinion. 
This paper argues that having a better monitoring mechanism, particularly by internal auditors, not only improves 
controls and financial reporting quality but also increases the effectiveness and efficiency of firm operations. We posit that 
a higher investment on internal audit activities can reduce the going concern opinions issued by external auditors as a result 
of improving the internal monitoring mechanisms of firms. Therefore, a higher investment in the internal audit function 
reduces the risk of receiving a going concern opinion from external auditors.  
We collect 137 firm-year observations of financially distressed firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia from 2016 to 
2018 to investigate such relationship. The financially distressed firms are identified by using the Zmijewski model, which 
allows more observations to be tested in the model usage compared to PN17 firms. Financial data are obtained from the 
Datastream database, whereas internal audit investment and governance-specific data are manually collected from the annual 
reports of the selected firms. To examine the relationship between internal audit investment and going concern opinion, this 
study uses the going concern opinion model of Bronson et al. (2009).  
Our empirical analysis shows that internal audit investment is negatively related to the likelihood for financially 
distressed firms to receive a going concern opinion. These results suggest that an internal audit investment can reduce the 
risk of receiving a going concern opinion from an external auditor, thereby supporting our argument that a higher investment 
in internal audit function will increase the compliance of internal control and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of a 
firm’s operations, thereby ensuring the success of its recovery plans. 
This study offers three contributions to the literature. First, this paper extends agency theory, which posits that the 
internal audit function not only imposes as a bonding cost to managers but also fulfils a monitoring role. Therefore, an 
internal auditor helps an external auditor in reducing the risk of financial misstatements while mitigating operational 
problems. With an increased investment in the internal audit function, more competent and a higher number of internal 
auditors can be employed to better monitor the internal controls of firms and improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
their operations. Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the going concern problem reported by external auditors 
given that this topic continues to attract considerable interest. This study specifically presents new evidence from Malaysia 
given that our present understanding of such relationship is limited to developing countries. Third, our findings indicate that 
firms should consider maintaining their investments in the internal audit function despite facing financial distress to increase 
assurance on their controls and to improve their operations. We also highlight that the benefits of investing in internal audit 
outweigh the associated cost for firms, especially the financially distressed ones. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the going concern problem, internal audit 
investment, and research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research methodology. Section 4 illustrates and discusses the 





This section reviews two streams of literature. The first stream is related to the going concern problem reported by external 
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GOING CONCERN OPINION 
 
Going concern is the most common problem being faced by firms with poor corporate governance, large amount of losses, 
and operational issues, such as restructuring and dissolution of business (Chan & Walter 1996; Lim 1997). The decision to 
issue a modified going concern opinion has to be made by an external auditor when its client needs to pay its outstanding 
obligations, maintain its business operations after encountering legal proceedings, retain its working capital, or deal with 
serious internal problems even if such problems are not financial in nature (Arens et al. 2012). In Malaysia, the International 
Standards on Auditing 570 Going Concern (ISA 570) suggests that auditors should issue an unqualified opinion with a 
“Material Uncertainty Related to Going Concern” section when the going concern assumption is appropriate in making a 
financial statement. Before issuing such opinion, external auditors usually learn about the plans of managers to ascertain the 
strategy of their firms in mitigating the going concern problem. An unqualified modified or qualified audit report with a 
going concern problem is issued if the external auditor has considerable doubt on the ability of a firm to maintain its viability. 
Previous studies show that the issuance of a going concern opinion is affected by several factors, including client, 
auditor, auditor–client and environmental factors (Carson et al. 2013). Client factors can be categorized into financial (i.e., 
profitability, liquidity, and leverage) and non-financial items (i.e., corporate governance and strategic initiatives). For non-
financial items, corporate governance has been identified as one of the main factors that contribute to the issuance of a going 
concern opinion (Carson et al. 2013), thereby suggesting that an improved corporate governance increases the level of 
transparency in the financial system and enhancing investor confidence. In addition, Basuony et al. (2014) suggest that 
agency conflicts can be reduced by using the appropriate corporate governance tools, including the presence of an effective 
internal auditor.  
Other studies have examined the accuracy of a going concern opinion. Geiger and Rama (2006) found that the 
accuracy of going concern reporting by Big 4 audit firms is higher than that of non-Big 4 firms. Burgland et al. (2018) found 
that smaller audit firms are less likely to issue going concern opinions to financially distressed firms than Big 4 audit firms. 
An accurate issuance of a going concern opinion is pertinent to the preservation of stakeholder interest. Shareholders, 
investors, bankers, suppliers and creditors further decisions will be based in accuracy of the opinion as they are the main 
users of the audit. Meanwhile, Coelho et al. (2012) show that when firms receive a going concern opinion, investors will 
change their investments in the firms’ competitors. Raza et al. (2018) found that one third of Malaysian delisted firms have 
received a going concern opinion prior to their delisting status. A going concern opinion may affect the competitiveness of 
firms in a way that the going concern opinion brings positive news to the competitors’ market price. Iskandar et al. (2013) 
found that CEO duality is positively related to going concern opinion and argue that the CEO, who also serves as the 
chairman of the company, is not independent enough to resolve the going concern problem of his/her company. Moreover, 
those firms with a high equity ownership from management and institutional investors are negatively and significantly 
associated with going concern opinion. In sum, despite evidence on the determinants, accuracy, and consequences related 
to going concern opinion reporting, the relationship between internal audit investment and going concern reporting has been 
supported by minimal empirical evidence. Therefore, we further examine the influence of internal audit function, as another 




The second stream of literature reviewed in this study is related to the internal audit function. Many studies have focused on 
outsourcing the internal audit function (e.g., Barr–Pulliam 2016; Abdolmohammadi 2013; Anderson et al. 2012; Carey et 
al. 2006; Ismael 2018; Davidson et al. 2013; Bartlett et al. 2015). For instance, Barr–Pulliam (2016) shows that 
approximately 38% of organizations around the world have outsourced their internal auditing functions. Compared with 
public and private companies, financial institutions, publicly traded firms, and non-profit organizations are more likely to 
outsource their internal audit functions. Abdolmohammadi (2013) found a positive and significant association between audit 
committee involvement and outsourcing. Outsourcing is also found to be negatively associated with the size of internal audit 
function (Anderson et al. 2012; Carey et al. 2006). Other studies on the formation of an internal audit function have focused 
on its determinants. Ismael (2018) investigated those factors that influence the voluntary use of internal audit. By using a 
sample of 332 UK non-financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange Main Market, they found that those factors 
associated with the formation of an internal audit function include firm size, risks, agency problem, and effective audit 
committee. With regard to the relationship between external auditor and internal audit function, Davidson et al. (2013) found 
that an external auditor neither relies on in-house nor outsource its internal audit function. By contrast, Bartlett et al. (2015) 
found that outsourcing an internal audit function is related to a greater reliance from an external auditor. Therefore, internal 
auditing affects the work of external auditors, including their judgment of the going concern problem. 
Apart from its outsourcing, other studies have focused on the determinants and effectiveness of the internal audit 
function (Narayanaswamy et al. 2019; Goodwin–Stewart & Kent 2006), its costs (Carcello et al. 2005; Barua et al. 2010), 
and its investment in Malaysia (Omer & Al-Qadasi 2020; Al-Dhamari et al. 2018; Wan–Hussin & Bamahros 2013). Previous 
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determinants of this function (e.g., Goodwin–Stewart & Kent 2006; Gronewold & Heerlein 2009). Narayanaswamy et al. 
(2019) suggest that size, publicly listed companies, direct chief internal audit reporting (CAE) to audit committee, and total 
number of years of CAE are all associated with the extent of support for the internal audit function. By contrast, both Barua 
et al. (2010) and Carcello et al. (2005) review the effect of investment in internal audit in the US and found that such 
investment is significantly and positively related to company size, industry types, leverage, inventory, cash flows from 
operations, and number of audit committee meetings yet is negatively related to the presence of auditing experts in the audit 
committee and the average tenure of audit committee members (Barua et al. 2010; Carcello et al. 2005). Some studies in 
Malaysia have also examined internal audit investment. Omer and Al-Qadasi (2020) suggest that family firms invest less in 
the internal audit function. Meanwhile, Al-Dhamari et al. (2018) document the effects of audit committee characteristics on 
internal audit investment by using data from 96 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2012 to 2014 and found that audit 
committee meeting is positively and significantly associated with internal audit investment. Wan-Hussin and Bamahros 
(2013) found a negative and significant relationship between internal audit function and external audit reporting delay. In 
sum, given the importance of investing in internal audit, examining the relationship between such investment and the going 
concern status of firms can enrich the auditing literature. 
We also review some studies on the effects of internal audit practices. For example, Archambeault et al. (2008) 
found that internal audit disclosures promote investors’ understanding of the internal audit function in governance. Breger 
et al. (2020) argued that external auditors have increased their reliance on internal auditing since the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
2002 and found that these auditors are willing to rely on internal audit work if they adhere to the standards on internal 
auditing practices issued by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA). Cular et al. (2020) examined the reliance of external 
auditors on the internal audit function and found that if such function provides consulting services on enterprise risk 
management, then the reliance of external auditors will only increase when the audit committee effectiveness is strengthened. 
Both Breger et al. (2020) and Cular et al. (2020) studies were examine in an environment where external auditors are no 
longer allowed to provide internal audit services to their audit clients. The regulation applies both in the US Sarbanes Oxley 
Act (2002) and Malaysia (2008). In sum, despite evidence supporting the reliance of external auditors on internal audit work, 






IIA (2011) states that the internal audit function is critical for reviewing and assessing internal controls, risk management, 
and corporate governance. This function assures and consults firm managers to follow the internal policies and regulations 
and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations. Firms are exposed to the risk of non-compliance to 
regulations, inaccurate financial reporting, and inefficient operations due to their ineffective internal audit functions. For 
example, in terms of financial statement accuracy, Barua et al. (2010) argued that the internal audit function can ensure the 
integrity and quality of financial reporting. Theoretically, internal audit can be described as a bonding cost incurred by 
management in reducing their agency problems, such as adverse selection and moral hazards. Internal auditors are also 
expected to monitor the agency problems emerging at the management level. By reducing agency problems, internal auditors 
not only ensure compliance of regulation, standards, and policies but also, according to Al-Dhamari et al. (2018), are in the 
best position to comprehend and articulate business operations.  
This study argues that a greater investment in the internal audit function can reduce the likelihood for firms to 
receive a going concern opinion from external auditors. Specifically, internal audit is an important function of the internal 
monitoring mechanism in corporate governance, especially in ensuring the compliance and effectiveness of internal controls 
and the efficiency of operations. A greater investment in the internal audit function also corresponds to more competent 
internal audit departments that help firms (on activities and advice from experts) establish stronger controls over their 
financial reporting and improve their operations. Goh et al. (2013) suggested that the material weaknesses in internal control 
increase the likelihood for a firm to receive a going concern opinion because having a weak internal control increases the 
difficulties faced by an external auditor in determining the future financial performance and ability of firms to operate. 
Prawitt et al. (2009) also found that a well-funded internal audit function can provide additional resources that help the 
internal audit department in hiring and retaining highly competent personnel. According to Breger et al. (2020), an external 
auditor chooses to rely on internal audit works if the internal auditors are highly competent and objective. They also show 
that the compliance of internal audit to IIA standards influences the reliance decision of external auditors. In this paper, we 
examine whether internal audit investments affect the likelihood for a firm to receive a going concern opinion from an 
external auditor. Given that internal audit functions become more competent and objective when internal auditors have a 
sufficient amount of resources, we contend that a greater investment in these functions improves the ability of these auditors 
to ensure compliance, effective and efficient internal control systems, and operations. As a result, an effective internal audit 
function reduces the risk of receiving a going concern opinion from external auditors, especially for financially distressed 








Asian Journal of Accounting and Governance                                    ISSN2180-3838 
                                                              e-ISSN2716-6060 
5 
 






DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
This study tests the above hypothesis by selecting financially distressed firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia from 2016 to 
2018. We identify financially distressed firms based on the financial distress prediction model of Zmijewski (1984). 
Specifically, Zmijewski (1984) argued that firms are in distress if the probability of financial distress model is greater than 
0. The required data were collected from two sources. On the one hand, the audit opinion and internal audit investment data 
were extracted from the annual reports of the selected firms. All manually collected accounting data are not commercially 
available. On the other hand, the financial accounting data were collected from the Datastream database, which is 
commercially available. Our final sample includes 137 financially distressed firm-year observations, of which 53 firms have 




A cross-sectional model was adapted from Bronson et al. (2009). While Bronson et al. (2009) focused on the effects of audit 
committees on going concern reporting, this study focuses on the effects of internal audit investments. A new variable, 
LN_IAI, was incorporated into the model to analyse the effect of internal audit investments on the likelihood of receiving a 
going concern opinion. LN_IAI is represented by the natural log of internal audit investment. The dependent variable is the 
likelihood of going concern opinion (GC), a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for firms with a going concern opinion 
and 0 for other firms. We tested our hypothesis by using the following logistic regression model to check the relationship 
between internal audit investment and the likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion: 
 
GC = β0 + β1LN_IAI + β2ACIND + β3ACMEET + β4ACFIN + β5LNTA + β6BIG4 + β7AUDITLAG + β8PRIOROPN + 
β9ZMISCORE + β10INDUSTRY + ε                          (1) 
 
We controlled for several variables that influence the likelihood for an external auditor to issue a going concern 
opinion. Previous studies indicate that a going concern opinion is positively associated with audit committee independence 
(Bronson et al., 2009). Therefore, we controlled for the percentage of audit committee independence. We also controlled for 
other corporate governance characteristics, such as the percentage of meetings attended and the number of audit committee 
members with financial expertise. Other control variables include audit quality (BIG4), delay in audit report issuance 
(AUDITLAG), issuance of a prior going-concern report (PRIOROPN), firm size (LNTA), and financial condition (ZMI). 
BIG4 takes a value of 1 if the firm is being audited by a Big 4 audit firm and takes a value of 0 otherwise, AUDITLAG 
represents days between the year end and the audit report date, PRIOROPN takes a value of 1 if a going concern report is 
issued in the previous year and takes a value of 0 otherwise, LNTA is the natural log of total assets, and ZMI is Zmijewski’s 
(1984) scores of financial condition index. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
DESCRIPTIVE AND UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
 
Table 1 presents the overall descriptive statistics of our sample. Approximately 38.7% (53 out of 137) of the financially 
distressed firms in our sample have received a going concern opinion. The mean, minimum, and maximum values for internal 
audit investment (IAI) for our entire sample are RM220,000, RM5,100, and RM5,800,000, respectively. For governance 
characteristics, the mean and minimum values for audit committee independence for all firms are 87% and 66.7%, 
respectively. The audit committees in our sample conduct an average of 5 meetings every year with a minimum and 
maximum of 1 and 11 meetings, respectively. At least a quarter of the audit committee members of each firm has financial 
expertise. Big 4 (BIG4) audit firms audit 63.5% of the sample, and the average time of audit or audit lag (AUDITLAG) for 
the sample is 107 days. On average, 19.7% of our sample has received a going concern opinion in their prior audit reports 
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TABLE 1. Overall descriptive analysis 
Variables n Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
GC 137 0.387 0.489 0 0 1 
IAI 137 220,000 690,000 5,100 50,000 5,800,000 
LN_IAI 137 10.992 1.390 8.531 10.820 15.580 
ACIND 137 0.886 0.155 0.667 1.000 1.000 
ACMEET 137 5.153 1.283 1.000 5.000 11.000 
ACFE 137 0.417 0.152 0.250 0.333 1.000 
BIG4 137 0.635 0.483 0.000 1.000 1.000 
AUDITLAG 137 107 38 38 104 480 
PRIOR 137 0.197 0.399 0.000 0.000 1.000 
TA(‘000) 137 1,500,000 5,200,000 26 410,000 44,000,000 
LNTA 137 19.382 2.409 10.166 19.820 24.504 
ZMI 137 1,400.000 16,000.000 0.005 0.826 80,000.000 
INDUSTRY 137 6.183 4.090 1.000 5.000 15.000 
Note: GC is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 for firms with going concern opinion and 0 otherwise; IAI is the 
amount of internal audit investment; LN_IAI represents the  natural log of internal audit investment; ACIND represents the 
proportion independent member of each audit committee; ACMEET is the number of audit committee meeting for the year; 
ACFE represents the number of financial expertise in among members of each audit committee; BIG4 is 1 if the firms being 
audited by Big four audit firm and 0 otherwise; AUDITLAG is days between the year end and the audit report date; 
PRIOROPN is 1 if going concern report in prior year and 0 otherwise; TA is the amount of total assets of the firms; LNTA is 
the natural log of total assets; ZMI is Zmijewski’s (1984) scores of financial condition index (Firms with the X value more 
than 0 are predicted in financial distress); INDUSTRY is the firm industry. 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the samples by going concern opinion. The mean, minimum, and 
maximum IAI for firms with a going concern problem are RM62,000, RM7,150, and RM810,031, respectively. The average 
IAI for firms that receive a going concern opinion is lower (approximately RM62,000) than that of firms with clean reports 
(approximately RM320,000), thereby suggesting that the firms that receive a going concern opinion allocate less resources 
to their internal audit investment compared with their clean report counterparts. However, these two groups of firms do not 
significantly differ in their corporate governance characteristics. For example, 41.7% of the audit committee members in 
both groups of firms have financial expertise. In line with our expectations, 52 out of 53 (98%) going concern firms have 
received a going concern opinion from BIG4 auditors, whereas more than half of the clean report firms have been audited 
by non-BIG4 auditors. Among the 53 firms that have received a going concern opinion, 41.5% or 22 firms have received a 
going concern opinion in the previous year. These firms also take a longer time to be issued an audit report (119 days) 
compared with their clean report counterparts (99 days). 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix. As expected, LN_IAI is negative and significantly associated with 
going concern opinion reporting. The univariate analysis supports our hypothesis on the relationship between internal audit 
investment and external auditor going concern reporting. For the control variables, we find a positive and significant 
relationship between BIG4 and the dependent variable (with a correlation coefficient of 0.571), thereby suggesting that Big 
4 audit firms are more likely to report a going concern opinion than non-Big 4 ones. The correlation between AUDITLAG 
and going concern opinion is also significant with a coefficient of 0.259, thereby suggesting that auditors may need more 
time to issue a going concern opinion when auditing financially distressed firms. The highly negative relationship between 
LNTA and the likelihood of receiving a going concern opinion suggests that the likelihood of receiving such opinion is 
associated with smaller firms than with larger firms. However, we do not find any significant relationship between 
governance-specific variables and going concern opinion. The correlation matrix analysis also reveals the absence of any 
multicollinearity problems due to the low correlation coefficients. 
 
 
TABLE 2. Descriptive by going concern opinion 
 Going concern opinion  Non-going concern opinion 
   (n=53)      (n=84)   
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Median  Mean Std. Dev. Median 
IAI 62,000 110,000 40,000  320,000 860,000 69,000 
LN_IAI 10.478 0.954 10.597  11.316 1.523 11.144 
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ACMEET 5.245 1.175 5.000  5.095 1.350 5.000 
ACFE 0.417 0.148 0.333  0.417 0.155 0.333 
BIG4 0.981 0.137   0.417 0.496  
AUDITLAG 119.094 56.170 112.000  99.000 14.787 102.000 
PRIOR 0.415 0.498   0.060 0.238  
TA (‘000) 460,000 560,000 290,000  2,100,000 6,600,000 470,000 
LNTA 18.784 2.417 19.501  19.759 2.340 19.979 
ZMI 62,000 110,000 40,000  320,000 860,000 69,000 
INDUSTRY 5.566 4.000 3.925  6.571 8.000 4.166 
Note: This table reports the mean, standard deviation and median for all variables used in the analyses by going concern opinion. 
Note: IAI is the amount of internal audit investment; LN_IAI represents the  natural log of internal audit investment; ACIND represents 
the proportion independent member of each audit committee; ACMEET is the number of audit committee meeting for the year; ACFE 
represents the number of financial expertise in among members of each audit committee; BIG4 is 1 if the firms being audited by Big 
four audit firm and 0 otherwise; AUDITLAG is days between the year end and the audit report date; PRIOR is 1 if going concern 
report in prior year and 0 otherwise; TA is the amount of total assets of the firms; LNTA is the natural log of total assets; ZMI is 
Zmijewski’s (1984) scores of financial condition index (Firms with the X value more than 0 are predicted in financial distress); 





Table 4 presents the logistic regression results. The model has a chi-square of 118.23 (p > 0.01), thereby indicating its good 
fit to the data. Meanwhile, the Nagelkerke R2, Cox and Snell Pseudo-R2, and McFadden R2 values suggest that 78.5%, 
57.8%, and 64.7% of the changes in the dependent variable can be explained by our model, respectively. Consistent with 
the univariate test results, Table 4 shows that internal audit investment is negatively and significantly related to the likelihood 
for external auditors to issue a going concern opinion (β=–1.168, p < 0.01), thereby supporting our hypothesis that internal 
audit investments influence the going concern problem reported by external auditors for financially distressed firms. This 
result also supports our argument that an effective internal audit function facilitates the recoverability of firms through the 
assurance and consulting services provided by internal auditors. These auditors not only assess the financial distress risk 
faced by firms but also ensures the effectiveness of their internal control and operational activities, which later translate into 
improved financial performance and reduce the likelihood of the going concern opinions reported by an external auditor. 
These results are also in line with those of Al-Dhamari et al. (2018), who argued that which internal auditors not only ensure 
compliance of regulation, standards, and policies but are also in the best position to comprehend and articulate the business 
operations of firms. 
Table 4 presents the results for the control variables, namely, BIG4, AUDITLAG, PRIOR, LNTA, and ZMI. Among 
these variables, only BIG4, AUDITLAG, and PRIOR are significantly and positively related to going concern opinion. The 
BIG4 and AUDITLAG coefficients of 6.560 and 0.046 are positive and significant at the 0.01 and 0.1 levels, whereas the 
PRIOR coefficient of 2.642 is positive and significant at the 0.05 level. Therefore, a firm faces a higher probability of 
receiving a going concern opinion if audited by big firms or if issued a going concern opinion in its previous audit. By 
contrast, all our governance-specific variables are not significantly related to going concern opinion, whereas LNTA is 














Asian Journal of Accounting and Governance                                    ISSN2180-3838 




TABLE 3. Pearson (Spearman) correlation analysis 
 
 GC IAI LN_IAI ACIND ACMEET ACFE BIG4 AUDLAG PRIOR TA (‘000) LNTA ZMI INDUSTRY 
GC 1 -0.277* -0.277* 0.052 0.138 -0.002 0.571* 0.351* 0.435* -0.240* -0.240* 0.302* -0.112 
IAI -0.181* 1 1.000* -0.092 0.044 -0.048 0.178* -0.074 -0.187* 0.615* 0.615* -0.328* -0.054 
LN_IAI -0.295* 0.638* 1 -0.092 0.044 -0.048 0.178* -0.074 -0.187* 0.615* 0.615* -0.328* -0.054 
ACIND 0.046 0.070 -0.064 1 -0.133 -0.113 -0.118 0.083 0.019 -0.064 -0.064 0.043 -0.205* 
ACMEET 0.057 -0.019 0.059 -0.170* 1 -0.062 0.087 0.085 -0.092 -0.004 -0.004 -0.035 0.023 
ACFE 0.000 0.026 0.014 -0.119 -0.016 1 0.045 -0.057 0.031 -0.042 -0.042 0.053 -0.019 
BIG4 0.571* 0.119 0.178* -0.120 0.044 0.050 1 0.217* 0.185* 0.174* 0.174* 0.085 -0.058 
AUDITLAG 0.259* -0.095 -0.163 0.095 -0.200* -0.074 0.157 1 0.146 -0.101 -0.101 0.139 0.011 
PRIOR 0.435* -0.125 -0.216* 0.020 -0.131 0.030 0.185* 0.196* 1 -0.244* -0.244* 0.310* -0.163 
TA (‘000) -0.153 0.659* 0.510* 0.083 -0.052 0.004 0.119 -0.077 -0.103 1 1.0000* -0.366* 0.011 
LNTA -0.198* 0.336* 0.534* -0.041 0.068 -0.098 0.121 -0.171* -0.328* 0.385* 1 -0.366* 0.011 
ZMI -0.070 -0.027 -0.095 0.065 -0.149 -0.036 0.060 0.005 -0.037 -0.019 -0.003 1 0.032 
INDUSTRY -0.120 -0.090 -0.052 -0.198* 0.013 -0.014 -0.044 -0.057 -0.162 -0.074 0.045 0.035 1 
Note: *correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). GC is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 for firms with going concern opinion and 0 otherwise; IAI is the amount of internal 
audit investment; LN_IAI represents the  natural log of internal audit investment; ACIND represents the proportion independent member of each audit committee; ACMEET is the number of audit 
committee meeting for the year; ACFE represents the number of financial expertise in among members of each audit committee; BIG4 is 1 if the firms being audited by Big four audit firm and 0 
otherwise; AUDITLAG is days between the year end and the audit report date; PRIOR is 1 if going concern report in prior year and 0 otherwise; TA is the amount of total assets of the firms; LNTA 
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TABLE 4. Main results (Logistic analysis) 
Variables Coefficient P-value 
Dependent variable: GC   
Constant 2.752 0.607 
LN_IAI -1.168*** 0.000 
ACIND 2.664 0.221 
ACMEET 0.115 0.620 
ACFE 1.062 0.642 
BIG4 6.560*** 0.000 
AUDITLAG 0.046* 0.066 
PRIOR 2.642** 0.022 
LNTA -0.198 0.286 
ZMI -0.00137 0.278 
INDUSTRY 2.752 0.607 
   
Cox and Snell Pseudo-R2 0.578  
Nagelkerke R2 0.785  
% of correct prediction 64.7  
Model’s chi-square 118.23***  
Note: ***Significant at the 0.01 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; *significant at the 0.1 level. LN_IAI represents the  natural 
log of internal audit investment; ACIND represents the proportion independent member of each audit committee; ACMEET is 
the number of audit committee meeting for the year; ACFE represents the number of financial expertise in among members of 
each audit committee; BIG4 is 1 if the firms being audited by Big four audit firm and 0 otherwise; AUDITLAG is days between 
the year end and the audit report date; PRIOR is 1 if going concern report in prior year and 0 otherwise; LNTA is the natural log 
of total assets; ZMI is Zmijewski’s (1984) scores of financial condition index (Firms with the X value more than 0 are predicted 
in financial distress); INDUSTRY is the firm industry. 
ROBUSTNESS TEST 
 
Despite our small sample, we discover that internal audit investment reduces the likelihood of receiving a going concern 
opinion from an external auditor. To test the credibility of our findings, we perform a logistic regression analysis by using 
an alternative proxy for financially distressed firms. We choose those observations with a net loss position from our sample 
as another proxy for financially distressed firms. The robustness test results are consistent with the main findings reported 
earlier. Table 5 below presents the robustness test results. 
 
TABLE 5. Robustness test 
Variables Coefficient P-value 
Dependent variable: GC   
Constant 1.984 0.781 
LN_IAI -1.255*** 0.007 
ACIND 5.208 0.112 
ACMEET -0.152 0.663 
ACFE 2.065 0.538 
BIG4 7.182*** 0.000 
AUDITLAG 0.032 0.307 
PRIOR 1.880 0.157 
LNTA -0.143 0.649 
ZMI -0.001 0.349 
INDUSTRY 1.984 0.781 
   
Cox and Snell Pseudo-R2 0.586  
Nagelkerke R2 0.781  
% of correct prediction 63.5  
Model’s chi-square 69.6***  
Note: ***Significant at the 0.01 level; **significant at the 0.05 level; *significant at the 0.1 level. LN_IAI represents the  natural 
log of internal audit investment; ACIND represents the proportion independent member of each audit committee; ACMEET is the 
number of audit committee meeting for the year; ACFE represents the number of financial expertise in among members of each 
audit committee; BIG4 is 1 if the firms being audited by Big four audit firm and 0 otherwise; AUDITLAG is days between the year 
end and the audit report date; PRIOR is 1 if going concern report in prior year and 0 otherwise; LNTA is the natural log of total 
assets; ZMI is Zmijewski’s (1984) scores of financial condition index (Firms with the X value more than 0 are predicted in financial 
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This paper examines the relationship between internal audit investments and going concern problem as reported by external 
auditors for financially distressed firms in Malaysia with an aim to show how a going concern opinion changes when internal 
audit investment is added as a variable to our model. By using 137 observations of financially distressed firms listed on 
Bursa Malaysia from 2016 to 2018, our main results suggest that internal audit investment is negatively and significantly 
related to the going concern opinion reported by external auditors. In other words, internal audit contributes to the 
recoverability process of firms by improving their controls and operations, which in turn reduces the probability for external 
auditors to issue a going concern opinion. To enhance the credibility of our findings, we conduct a robustness test by using 
alternative measures of financial distress. Our robustness test results are consistent with our main analysis results. 
Our findings provide important implications for managers and internal auditors. On the one hand, managers must 
at least maintain their investment in internal audit to reduce their risk of receiving a going concern opinion from external 
auditors. Reducing such investment may also deteriorate the conditions of their firms, and the controls, effectiveness, and 
efficiency of their operations need to be in place especially during periods of financial distress. Instead of reducing their 
internal audit investments, managers should focus on their strategies and recovery plans while allowing internal auditors to 
focus on their controls, operational efficiency, and effectiveness. These results imply that internal auditors play a crucial 
role for financially distressed firms by ensuring that the strategies and plans of these firms are carefully executed and closely 
monitored.  
This study has several limitations. To overcome these limitations, we identify several avenues for future research. 
First, our findings may not be generalizable to all listed firms because we only focus on financially distressed firms listed 
on Bursa Malaysia. Future studies may consider using a larger sample that comprise all firms listed on Bursa Malaysia and 
utilize a panel data research design that may to yield different results. Second, given that we are only using Zmijewski’s 
(1984) scores of financial condition index and net loss position, future studies should consider other proxies for financially 
distressed firms. Third, this study does not consider the extent of an external auditor’s reliance on internal auditor work as a 
control variable. Therefore, future research should control for the level of external auditor reliance if such data are available. 
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